

09 [REDACTED] OCT 78

266
3

SECRET 09 [REDACTED] OCT 78 CITE SANTIAGO [REDACTED]

IMMEDIATE [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1. COS MORNING 8 OCTOBER BRIEFED [REDACTED]
ON USG POSITION. TOLD THEM, USG FAVORS MILITARY SOLUTION AND
WILLING TO SUPPORT IT IN ANY MANNER SHORT OF OUTRIGHT MILITARY
INTERVENTION. (DID NOT INTIMATE THAT THIS MIGHT ENCOMPASS
SUPPORT FOR VIAUX MINICOU). STATES THAT USG POSITION KNOWN
TO FREI, [REDACTED] AND CERTAIN KEY MILITARY, ALL OF WHOM KNOW THAT
THEY CAN COUNT ON USG SUPPORT FOR MILITARY SOLUTION NOW THAT
POLITICAL EXPEDIENTS HAVE EVIDENTLY BEEN EXHAUSTED. MENTIONED
THAT FREI HIMSELF ON RECORD AS VIEWING MILITARY INTERVENTION
AS ONLY FEASIBLE SOLUTION FOR PROBLEM OF KEEPING ALLENDE OUT
OF POWER. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION BY [REDACTED] WHETHER USG
POSITION HAS ONLY BEEN IMPARTED TO TOP LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES,
ADMITTED THIS BY AND LARGE THE CASE, BUT THAT WE CAN SEE NO
REASON FOR WITHHOLDING IT FROM LOWER ECHELON COMMAND LEVELS,
ESPECIALLY REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS. [REDACTED] SHOULD FEEL FREE,
ON SELECTIVE BASIS, TO STATE THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING OF USG
POSITION AS SET FORTH ABOVE.

PAGE 2 SANTIAGO ~~SECRET~~

2. ~~REDACTED~~ PROVIDED COS WITH HIS ESTIMATE OF ARMED FORCES STATE OF READINESS TO INTERVENE WHICH, IN ALL SALIENT RESPECTS, TALLIES WITH STATION'S. QUOTED ~~REDACTED~~ AS STATING ON ~~REDACTED~~ THAT HE AND SCHNEIDER AT ONE IN DESIRING MILITARY INTERVENTION, BUT FINDING SELVES BEREFT OF ANY PRETEXT TO LAUNCH ARMED FORCES INTO EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL INTERVENTION. ~~REDACTED~~ ON 7 OCTOBER REITERATED TO ~~REDACTED~~ OWN WILLINGNESS TO STEP IN IF ARMY MOVES FIRST. ~~REDACTED~~ VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT ARMED FORCES WHICH BADLY SPLIT. MENTIONED ~~REDACTED~~ AS MAINLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HAVING OPENED SLUICE GATES BY ALLOWING SEVERAL ~~REDACTED~~ TO MEET WITH ALLENDE. THIS HAS HAD SHATTERING IMPACT ON ARMY WHICH NOW ALSO BEGINNING TO EMULATE NAVY.

3. ~~REDACTED~~ STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF PROVIDING ARMED FORCES WITH ISSUE PROVIDING SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION. ASKED WHAT U.S. COULD DO IN THIS REGARD. TOLD BY COS WE HAD TRIED TO CREATE CHAOTIC ECONOMIC CONDITIONS BUT BEING THWARTED EVERY STEP OF WAY BY FREI AND HIS MINISTERS. AS REGARDS ACTS OF TERROR, WE OBVIOUSLY

PAGE 3 SANTIAGO [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~

PREFERRED NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED, BESIDES DOUBTING THEIR EFFICACY FOR PURPOSES INDICATED. SUMMED UP USG POSITION BY EMPHASIZING THAT IT BEHOOVES CHILEANS THEMSELVES TO CREATE CLIMATE WHICH ARMED FORCES MAY FIND CONDUCTIVE TOWARD EXECUTION OF GOLPE. DISMISSED SOME OF [REDACTED] MORE PREPOSTEROUS SUGGESTIONS AS TO UNREAL TO MERIT CONSIDERATION. TOLD HIM THAT "BIOLOGICAL WARFARE" OUT. (HE INQUIRED ABOUT SKIN IRRITANTS). [REDACTED] REGRETFULLY STATED THAT HIS [REDACTED] HAD NO PERSONNEL SKILLED IN PARAMILITARY OF TERRORISTIC PURSUITS.

4. ELABORATING ON USG POSITION (WITH PARTICULAR RELEVANCY TO [REDACTED] POLICIES), COS ASKED [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] TO DISCARD ALL THOUGHT OF RESISTANCE UNDER ALLENDE. TOLD THEM THAT OUR PROGRAM TO RECONSTITUTE CHILE'S POLITICAL CENTER HAD BEEN COLD-SHOULDERED BY USG WHICH STRONGLY PREFERRED ACTION NOW AND AT WHATEVER COST.

5. AFTER LISTENING TO [REDACTED] BRIEFING ON TALK WITH ALLENDE (ROUGHLY ALONG LINED [REDACTED]), COS MADE POINT THAT REVOLUTION WOULD DEVOUR THEM, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR VOTE FOR OR AGAINST. TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR SUPPORT OF ALLENDE WOULD

[REDACTED]

PAGE 4 SANTIAGO [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~

BE REQUIRED BY UNIDED POPULAR WHICH, AS RESULT, WOULD MODERATE ITS VIEWS AND PRACTICES AND ADOPT POSTURES LEANING TOWARD CENTER, WOULD BE HEIGHT OF NAIVETE. TOLD THEM THAT MOST OF ALLENDE'S ASSURANCES COULD EASILY BE DISPROVEN. AS AN EXAMPLE, ALLENDE WAS BOUND TO FIND HIMSELF HEAVILY DEPENDENT UPON USSR FOR ECONOMIC AID TO FILL VOID LEFT BY EXODUS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL. THIS, IN TURN, SPELLED DEPENDENCE UPON PCCH WHICH COULD NOT SIMPLY BE SHUNTED ASIDE. ALLENDE'S STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD HAVE SUPPORT OF CHILEAN PEOPLE AND ARMED FORCES, SHOULD PCCH TRY TO ARROGATE TO ITSELF PRE-DOMINANT POWER, SIMPLY UNTRUE. REMINDED HIM THAT ARMED FORCES COULD EASILY BE PURGED OF ALL ELEMENTS PCCH VIEWS AS UNRELIABLE. COS UNDERSTOOD THAT UNPUBLISHED PART OF KASAKOV PAPERS CONTAINED COPY OF ARMY ESCALAFON WITH NOTATIONS NEXT TO NAMES OF OFFICERS CONSIDERED POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE. STATED FLATLY THAT [REDACTED] WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PLAY ROLE OF LOYAL OPPOSITION.

6. COS DISABUSED [REDACTED] OF ANY NOTION THAT EITHER [REDACTED] COULD BE PERSUADED TO INTERVENE IN [REDACTED]

PAGE 5 SANTIAGO ~~SECRET~~
CHILEAN SITUATION.

AT THIS POINT ONLY

USG SEEMED TO CARE AND TO BE WILLING TO INCUR CERTAIN NOT
NEGLECTIBLE RISK TO HELP CHILEANS TO HELP THEMSELVES. CHILEANS
WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY BY FORELOCK.

7. ~~SECRET~~ ASKED TO KNOW WHETHER USG PREFERRED REPRESSIVE
REGIME IN CHILE WITH ALL TRAPPINGS OF POLICE STATE OR REGIME
WHICH UPHOLDS IF NOT ALL DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS, AT LEAST SOME.
TOLD HIM THAT AS FAR AS USG CONCERNED, OPENLY REPRESSIVE
REGIME HAS MUCH TO COMMEND ITSELF, QUITE OBVIOUSLY ALLENDE
INTERESTED IN PN SUPPORT BECAUSE OF ITS TEMPORARY UTILITY
AS FIGLEAF. NONETHELESS, IMPERATIVES OF CHILE'S UNAVOID-
ABLE ISOLATION ONCE AMERICAN INFLUENCE HAS BEEN ERADICATED
WOULD BRING COUNTRY SOON UNDER SOVIET SWAY. NONETHELESS, COS
WOULD NOT WISH TO BE PLACED IN POSITION OF HAVING COUNSELLED

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 6 SANTIAGO [REDACTED] S E R E T

[REDACTED] TO REBUFF ALLENDE SINCE THIS MIGHT CONNOTE AT LEAST TACIT ASSUMPTION OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE COMMON CAUSE WITH PN LATER ON WHEN ALLENDE REGIME DECIDES TO SHOW TRUE COLORS. QUITE FRANKLY, USG IN NO MOOD AT PRESENT TO ENTERTAIN ANY LONGRANGE PROSPECTS BASED UPON INEVITABILITY OF ALLENDE VICTORY. WHAT COUNTED WAS ANYTHING [REDACTED] COULD DO BETWEEN NOW AND 24 OCTOBER TO STAVE OFF ALLENDE VICTORY. [REDACTED] SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT HELP IF [REDACTED] PUTS OFF FINAL DECISION UNTIL VERY LAST MOMENT. COS COMMENTED THAT ANY OPEN DECLARATION BY [REDACTED] IN FAVOR OF ALLENDE WOULD OBVIOUSLY PROVIDE ARMED FORCES WITH ADDITIONAL EXCUSE FOR DOING NOTHING. THEY COULD ARGUE THAT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE VIRTUALLY ASSURED OF UNANIMOUS CONGRESSIONAL VOTE TO BIG AN ADVERSARY TO TAKE ON.

8. BELIEVE MEETING MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL. BOTH INTERLOCUTORS MUST HAVE CARRIED AWAY IMPRESSION THAT USG IS NOT PLAYING DOUBLE GAME AND NOT TRYING TO DECEIVE THEM ABOUT ITS ASSESSMENT OF GRAVITY OF STEP THEY PROPOSE TO TAKE WITH RESPECT TO ALLENDE. NOTHING WAS SAID, HOWEVER, WHICH FORECLOSES

[REDACTED]

PAGE 7 SANTIAGO [REDACTED] S E R E I

POSSIBILITY OF CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP [REDACTED] IF ALLENDE SHOULD
BE ELECTED. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RELATED

OUTCOME OF RECENT VISITS BY [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]
WHICH PUZZLING. COS POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT FOR TIME BEING
CENTER OF DECISION IN SANTIAGO AND NO USEFUL PURPOSE SERVED
BY DISPATCH OF EMISSARIES.

9. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 8 SANTIAGO ~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

10. WINDING UP OUR DISCUSSION, COS ONCE MORE STRESSED
OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF LAUNCHING MILITARY INTERVENTION AND
ASKED [REDACTED] TO USE WHATEVER LEVERAGE [REDACTED] POSSESSES
IN MILITARY CIRCLES TO CONVINCE ARMED FORCES THAT CHILE'S
SALVATION LIES IN THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CHALLENGE ALLENDE AND
PARTIES BACKING HIM IN OPEN MILITARY CONFRONTATION FOR WHICH
THEY WOULD HAVE ALL THE AMERICAN BACKING THEY NEED. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]